The aim of the paper is to discuss the concept of independence as applied to public debt management. Although the focus is primarily on the institutional framework, the paper intends to offer a different approach, addressing how the adoption of more autonomous debt management can affect the conduct of national macroeconomic policies, with special emphasis on the relation between monetary and public debt policies. The paper is structured as follows: chapter one discusses how the changes on financial relations – related to the so-called “financial globalization have impacted the way public debt is managed. The second chapter explains fundamental relations between monetary and public debt policies, showing how they are reflected on the institutional framework, and describes three different models of institutional arrangements for public debt management. Based on the previous discussion, chapter three defines the concept of independence implied on DMOs’ structures. In order to explore the concept, chapter four describes the recent Brazil’s public debt performance and analyses how (and if) a more independent debt management would have helped to minimize the costs of the recent 1999 Real Plan crisis. Finally, conclusions are outlined at the last part.