The tale of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) can be related, in part, to a lack of local and global discipline that a domestic macroeconomic framework and an international monetary and financial system (IMFS) are supposed to mutually contribute to enforcing. Both should send warnings of and alert to excessive imbalances and price risk more adequately, whether sovereign or private. They have proved insufficient. In addition, the GFC, and especially the post-Lehman unconventional monetary policies (UMP) in key Advanced Economies (AEs) added more complex challenges to the macro framework that Emerging Markets Economies (EMEs) were used to implementing under the rules of Bretton Woods 2 (BW2; see Dooley et al (2004)): managing the “impossible trinity” using their Inflation Targeting (IT) framework became more complicated due to large movements of capital and more volatility in asset prices including the exchange rate (ER).[...]