The author presents an intertemporal optimizing model in which government debt initially follows an unsustainable path, a situation that can be resolved in three possible ways: (i) a fiscal adjustment; (ii) a government default; or (iii) higher inflation. The central bank can respond to a government debt rollover crisis by letting the government default or by rescuing the government from a default and letting inflation increase (monetary accommodation). He shows that if the fiscal adjustment requires a minimum amount of time to be implemented, it may be impossible to implement without a minimum level of accommodation on the side of the central bank. In general, the more accommodative the monetary authorities are expected to be, the more likely the fiscal adjustment. The likelihood of inflation is minimized when the central bank is either very accomodative or very unaccomodative. Monetary accommodation, however, does not provide a free lunch, because an accomodative central bank may increase inflation in equilibrium.